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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES S. DEAN and SHERLENE T.
DEAN,
Appellate No. 20110427
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
District Court No. 090908746
KANG SIK PARK, trustee of the KANG
SIK PARK REVOCABLE TRUST, and
MARSHA K. PARK,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES JAMES S. DEAN AND SHERLENE T. DEAN
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by Defendants Kang Sik Park, Trustee of the Kang Sik Park
Revocable Trust ("Dr. Park"), and Marsha K. Park ("Mrs. Park") (collectively, the "Parks"),
from a Judgment by the District Court, entered following a trial of the matter to the district
court. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Sections 78A-3-102(3)G),-3-102(4), and-4-103(2)(j).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue on Appeal No. 1:

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the Parks

had failed to meet their burden of proving "mutual acquiescence" by the parties and their
predecessors that the fence was the boundary between their respective lots.
Standard of Review:

The trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless

they are "clearly erroneous." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 1J22, 96 P.3d 935.
Appellants must marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, and demonstrate
that the "trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 143 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
Issue on Appeal No. 2:

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the Parks

had failed to meet their burden of proving that they had occupied the area between their record
boundary line and the fence for the requisite period of time.
Standard of Review:

The trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless

they are "clearly erroneous." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ^22, 96 P.3d 935.
Appellants must marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, and demonstrate
that the "trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The Deans do not believe any Constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
determinative or of central importance to this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a boundary dispute between owners of adjoining residential
properties in the Federal Heights area of Salt Lake City. The Deans own Lot 9, having
acquired it in April 2005 (R. 296:32, Ex. 4), and Dr. Park owns Lot 8, having acquired it in
1988 (R. 296:168). Intending to replace the wood fence located near the boundary line
between the Deans' and Parks' lots, the Deans obtained a survey. (R. 296:36-37; Ex. 3.) The
survey reflected that the existing wood fence was located inside the record boundary line of
the Deans' lot at certain points, resulting in a narrow long triangular shaped parcel between
the Deans' fence and their record boundary line (the "Disputed Parcel").

(Ex. 3.) In

connection with their anticipated new fence, and to protect their house, the Deans also desired
to remove certain "trash" trees (Siberian or Chinese elms) that were growing in the Disputed
Parcel. (Ex. D.)
After it became apparent that the Parks disputed the Deans' ownership of the Disputed
Parcel, and also refused to allow the Deans to remove the Siberian elms, the Deans filed this
action to quiet title to the Disputed Parcel. (R. 1-14.) Alternatively, the Deans sought an
order allowing them to remove the Siberian elms, which threatened their house and property.
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(R. 6-7.) The Parks counterclaimed, seeking title to the Disputed Parcel under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence. (R. 20-23.)
After a bench trial, District Court Judge Kennedy issued comprehensive Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 259-80.) Judge Kennedy concluded that the Parks had
failed to meet their burden of proving two elements of the boundary by acquiescence claim,
i.e., mutual acquiescence to the fence as the boundary, and occupation of the ground up to the
fence. (R. 272-77.) Judge Kennedy also found, alternatively, that the Siberian elms
constituted a private nuisance, and he would authorize the Deans to remove them, if they did
not already have the right to do so based on ownership of the property.1 (R. 277-79.)
In 1977, Mrs. Park (previously Marsha Morrison) and her prior husband, Dr. Jed
Morrison, acquired Lots 8, 9 and 10, of Federal Heights Plat "D." (R. 296:91.) They built a
house on Lot 10, and Mrs. Park resided there until 1983. (R. 296:92.) In a divorce
proceeding, Mrs. Park obtained title to Lots 8 and 10, and Jed Morrison took title to Lot 9.
R. 296: 2-93. In 1983, Jed Morrison conveyed Lot 9 to David Clark. (R. 244.)
In 1984, Mr. Clark, a professional architect, designed and built a home on Lot 9.2 (R.
264.) Prior to Mr. Clark's construction, the topography between Lots 9 and 8 was a gentle
slope, east (Lot 9) to west (Lot 8). (R. 296:95-97; Ex. A.) In connection with the construction
of the house, Mr. Clark brought in soil to raise and level his lot. (R. 296:98-99.) This created
!

This issue has not been addressed by the Parks in their appeal.

2

As noted by Judge Kennedy, Mr. Clark was unable to testify at trial due to various
ailments. (R. 264.)
4

a steeper drop-off between Lots 9 and 8. At the street (on the north), the drop-off was as
much as eight feet by Mrs. Park's estimate. (R. 296:100-01.) Near the southwest comer of
the house, where the fence began, the drop-off was about three feet, and the slope diminished
toward the south (rear) until the two lots were essentially level with each other. (R. 296:3536, 102-03.)
The Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions applicable to the lots required that
each dwelling have a minimum side setback of at least eight (8) feet, and the combined side
setbacks had to be at least twenty (20) feet. Ex. 2. Salt Lake City's zoning ordinance requires
ten foot side yard setbacks, but defers to the recorded plat if it deals with the issue. (R. 244,
249.) The house constructed by Mr. Clark was situated so that the sides were located
approximately ten feet from each side boundary line, which was in compliance with the side
setback requirements. (Ex. 3.)
Mr. Clark also constructed a wood fence, which was the fence the Deans sought to
replace. (R. 296: 102.) The wood fence was not located on the record property line. (Ex. 3.)
Instead, it began near the southwest comer of his house (about 3.5 feet inside the record
property line), jogged slightly toward the house (about 4.13 feet inside the record property
line), and then continued toward the rear (south) of the lot. (Id.) There was no fence along
the front portions of the boundary line. (Ex. 3, 7.) As the wood fence approached the rear of
the lot, it got closer to the record boundary line, until, approximately 35 feet north of the south
boundary line of Lot 9, the wood fence encountered and then ran parallel to a chain link fence
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until reaching the south boundary of the lot. (Ex. 3.) There was essentially no space between
the chain link and wood fences. (R. 296:55-56.) The chain link fence had been installed by
Mrs. Park and Dr. Morrison when they owned all three lots (R. 296:129, 131), and was (and
is) located on the record property line between Lots 8 and 9. (Ex.3.)
Mr. Clark's clear purpose in locating the fence where he did was to provide privacy
for his backyard and patio, and the trial court so found. (R. 266-67.) The fence was located
at the crest of the slope between the two lots. (Id.) Had the fence been placed on the record
boundary line, which was near the bottom of the steep slope, the fence would have extended
above the grade of Lot 9 by only about three feet. (R. 296:176.) It was also easier to build
the fence on top of the slope. (R. 266,274.) Judge Kennedy specifically found, "[T]he main
purpose of Clark's wood fence was privacy and ease of location rather than to mark a
boundary between the lots." (R. 267.)
Also in 1983, Mrs. Park constructed a new residence on Lot 8. She lived in the house
on Lot 10, and then moved into the new residence on Lot 8. (R. 296:96-98.) Thus, she
observed the construction of Mr. Clark's home and the wood fence. (R. 296:96-98.) In 1986,
Mrs. Park built a wood fence that ran perpendicular to, and abutted Mr. Clark's fence at its
north end. (R. 296:120.) She installed a gate in her fence, to provide access to her back yard.
Mrs. Park testified that the reason she installed the wood fence was to keep Mr. Clark's dogs
out of her back yard on Lot 8. (R. 296:120-21.)
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The trial court found that Mrs. Park had some degree of knowledge regarding where
the record boundary line was located. (R. 268.) This was based upon her experience as a real
estate agent, information from the plat map (when she and Dr. Morrison purchased the three
lots), and construction of homes on Lots 8 and 10. (R. 268-69.) She was the owner, with Dr.
Morrison, of Lots 8 and 9 at the time the chain link fence (located near the basketball court)
was constructed, and the chain link fence is located exactly on the record property line. (R.
268-69.) While Mrs. Park testified that she believed Mr. Clark's fence was located on the
boundary line, the Court specifically found that her testimony was not credible. (R. 269.)
The fact that the fence was not located on the property line was visually apparent to
even the casual observer. Looking from the front of the house to the rear along the property
line, one can see that the fence does not follow what otherwise appears to be the property line,
but in fact jogs around the trees. (Ex. 7 and 8.)
In 1988, Mrs. Park conveyed Lot 8 to Dr. Park, and moved out of the house. (R. 296:
110.) In 1991, Mrs. and Dr. Park married, and she returned to live at Lot 8 in 1993. (R. 296:
110.) Since 1988, Lot 8 has been owned by Dr. Park. (R. 296:168.)
Neither Mrs. Park nor Dr. Park ever discussed the location of the wood fence with Mr.
Clark (R. 296:107-08,150), or any later owners of Lot 9 (R. 296:122,150-51), until they were
notified of the Deans' intentions to tear down the wood fence and replace it with a new fence
on the record boundary line. (Ex. D.)

7

While there was evidence to the effect that Mr. Clark and the successor owners of Lot
9, including the Deans, had not entered on the Disputed Area for an extended period of time,
the testimony and evidence was also quite clear that the Parks did not use and occupy the
Disputed Area for a period of twenty years or more. The Parks did not treat any portion of
the Disputed Area as part of their own backyard. There were no sprinkler heads or lines in
the Disputed Area. (R. 296:116, 162) Any watering or fertilizing of the Disputed Area by
the Parks was purely incidental to the Parks' watering or fertilizing of their own backyard, and
was not intentional (R. 270), much the same as homeowners water and fertilize streets and
sidewalks unintentionally.
Mrs. Park testified that at no time did she, or anyone at her request, plant any trees or
shrubs in the Disputed Area (R. 296:103-05), nor did she plant or cause to be planted any
grass in the area. (R. 296:107.) However, Mrs. Park claimed that she and her children planted
flowers in one portion of the Disputed Area, and occasionally weeded the area, during the
period from 1984 to 1988. (R. 296:109-113.) Since 1993, however, Mrs. Park has not
planted any flowers in the area; in fact, she has "hardly ever stepped outside." (R. 296:113.)
Dr. Park asserted that in 1988, he planted one fruit tree in the Disputed Area, but it
later died. (R. 296:158-59. Other than that single tree, Dr. Park conceded that he planted no
trees or shrubs in the Disputed Area. (R. 296:159.) Dr. Park asserted that he planted
vegetables, such as zucchini, watermelon and strawberries, in the Disputed Area during the
period from 1988 to 2007. (R. 296:163-64). Thattestimonywas contradicted by Mrs. Dean's
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testimony that she had never seen Dr. Park (or Mrs. Park) gardening. (R. 296:174.) Dr.
Park's assertion was also contradicted by the absence of any evidence of cultivation, the fact
that nothing would grow among the trees (as there was no sun), and the invasive roots. (R.
296:174-75; Ex. 12-28.) Judge Kennedy specifically refused to give any weight to Dr. Park's
testimony on this issue. (R. 270).
Numerous photographs of the area depicted a wooded and unkempt area, filled with
underbrush and weeds, which had clearly not been maintained as either a lawn or garden for
an extended period of time. (Ex. 12 through 28.) In short, the physical appearance of the
Disputed Area contradicted the Parks' testimony that they treated and occupied the area as
part of their backyard.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal involves no significant question of law, as the elements of a boundary by
acquiescence claim are undisputed: (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences,
or buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for a period of at least 20 years;
and (4) by adjoining landowners. Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, 2011 UT 71, |6. The
burden of proof was on the Parks to establish the elements of the boundary by acquiescence claim.
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, 136 P.3d 1252.3

3

While the Deans specifically argued that the Parks were required to prove each
element of the claim by clear and convincing evidence (see Deans' Trial Statement at 3,
fn. 1, R. 253; R. 296:183-85), Judge Kennedy did not address the point, apparently
convinced that the Parks failed to meet even the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, 2011 UT 71, f3, an opinion issued by the Utah
Supreme Court between the filing of the opening briefs in this case, confirms that the
9

The Parks failed to present sufficient evidence to prove two of those elements,
occupation by the Parks of the Disputed Area and mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, particularly for a twenty-year period. Further, while the fence had clearly been in
existence for more than twenty years, the Parks did not prove that they had occupied the land
for any significant period of time, much less twenty years. Instead, the evidence established
that the Disputed Area was simply a neglected and unused narrow strip of land. Much of the
strip was steep and rocky; in essence, a retaining area that was not used as a lawn or garden,
or for any purpose. The evidence was clear that the fence was installed to provide privacy,
not to mark a boundary line, and that purpose was clear to both owners. Indeed, Mrs. Park,
as a prior owner of both lots, had knowledge where the actual property line was, and knew the
fence was not located on or intended to creaite a boundary.
The Parks' testimony of the Parks is essential to establish their claims; however, it is
important to note that Judge Kennedy specifically found their testimony was not credible on
key issues. (R. 269-70.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARKS FAILED TO PROVE
OCCUPATION OF THE DISPUTED AREA.

standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.
10

As noted by the Parks' brief, in evaluating the occupation requirement, "courts should
consider whether a particular "occupation up to a visible line" would place a reasonable party
on notice that the given line was being treated as the boundary between the properties." Bahr
v. Irnus, 2011 UT 19, p 6 . 4 Judge Kennedy's findings and conclusions refer to a similar
standard, "a pattern of use that is normal and appropriate for the character and location of the
land," citing Englertv. Zane, 848P.2d 165,170 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The credible evidence,
as found by Judge Kennedy, failed to meet even this modest standard.
In particular, the trial court found that there was no credible evidence that the Disputed
Area had been occupied or used by the Parks to the extent that the Deans or the prior owners
of Lot 9 would have been put on notice of such occupancy and use. On appeal, the Parks cite
to various factors that support their version of the truth. The trial court specifically rejected
some of the factors relied upon by the Parks as not being credible, and others are simply not
evidence of occupancy.
Dr. Park testified about his purported use of the Disputed Area, including seeding
grass, weeding, and planting vegetables. Dr. Park's testimony was inconsistent with other

Occupation and acquiescence tend to rely upon much of the same evidence. In
Essential Botanical, the Supreme Court held that acquiescence to the fence as the
boundary line may be objectively inferred from occupation and use, and the absence of
evidence that the record owner of the property disputed that the fence was the boundary.
Essential Botanical, 2011 UT 71, ^[30-31. As will be illustrated below, acquiescence
cannot be inferred from the evidence in this case, as the Parks failed to show occupation,
particularly to the level that the owners of Lot 9 would have been put on notice that the
Parks were asserting ownership of the Disputed Area.
11

evidence in several respects. The trial court specifically found his testimony regarding use
of the Disputed Area, and maintaining a vegetable garden, was not credible. (R. 270.) Hence,
the factors relied upon by the Parks in this appeal are not supported by credible evidence.
Even specific testimony from Mrs. Park failed to prove use and occupancy of the
Disputed Area to the level required, and there was no evidence from Mrs. Park to establish
any use or occupancy after 1988. Indeed, she specifically testified that she almost never went
in her backyard after 1993.
While the Deans have only lived in their house since 2005, their observations of the
Parks' non-use and non-occupancy of the Disputed Area were consistent with the trial court's
findings. Mrs. Dean never observed either of the Parks gardening, tending or planting
anything in the Disputed Area.
Photographs of the Disputed Area, while fairly recent, depict a strip of land that is not
botanically or visually part of the Parks'backyard. (Ex. 12-28.) The photographs illustrate
that the relatively abandoned appearance of the Disputed Area, which includes numerous
volunteer trees and undergrowth, has persisted for an extended period of time, such that it is
clear the Parks have not cultivated or tended the ground for many years, if they ever did. Even
the early photo produced by the Parks fails to show any lawn, gardening or other habitation
or use in the Disputed Area., (Ex. B.)
The Parks' evidence of occupation consists of two general positions: (1) that the side
yard fence they built prevented entrance by the Deans (and their predecessors) into the

12

Disputed Area, and (2) that they watered and fertilized the ground, and did not cut down the
volunteer trees. Of course, the side yard fence did not create any occupancy of the area by the
Parks. The watering and fertilizing was determined by the judge to be, at best, merely
incidental and not intentional. And, if allowing volunteer trees to grow constitutes occupancy,
then the Deans and their predecessors occupied the Disputed Area also.
The Parks come nowhere close to meeting their burden on appeal. They are required
to marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's finding of fact, i.e., that the Parks did
not occupy the ground in a manner sufficient to put the Deans and their predecessors on notice
of a claim of ownership, and then demonstrate how the evidence is insufficient to support the
finding. Particularly in light of the trial court's rejection of the Parks' testimony as not being
credible, the Parks have failed to meet this burden.
POINT II
THE PARKS FAILED TO PROVE THE PARTIES ACQUIESCED IN THE FENCE
AS THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE PARCELS.
Mutual acquiescence in this context requires proof that the parties "recognize and treat
an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the owner's property from the
adjacent landowner's property . . ." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 19, 44 P.3d 781. The
purpose for which a fence was erected should be considered, and in some cases the purpose
is determinative. See, e.g., Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979) (fence constructed to
control livestock, rather than to establish a boundary); Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v.
Babcock, 1999 UT App 366, 993 P.2d 229 (fence constructed to contain cattle). The court
13

may also consider the parties' knowledge of the correct boundary line in determining whether
there has been acquiescence to a fence as the boundary. Smith v. Security Investment LTD,
2009 UT App 355, ^[6. Here, the trial court, having considered the evidence, concluded that
the Parks had failed to establish acquiescence to the fence as the real boundary line between
Lots 8 and 9. The trial court's findings are well supported by the evidence.
The Parks knew that the fence was not on the record property line. The fence did not
follow a straight line (R. 296:34), and it did not align with the chain link fence toward the rear
of the property, which was in fact located exactly on the record boundary line. Looking from
the front of the house toward the rear, as depicted in Exhibits 7 and 8, it is apparent that the
fence jogs. Since Mrs. Park knew that the record lot lines were straight, she would also know
that the fence was not on the record lot line.
Even without the testimony of Mr. Clark, the photographs and the topography clearly
demonstrate that the fence was built where it was in order to provide privacy, and not to
establish a boundary line. The fence followed the crest of the slope, which had been created
when Mr. Clark built his home. Had Mr. Clark wished to build the fence on the boundary
line, he would have sacrificed any privacy, as the top of the fence would have been only three
feet above the level of his backyard. Mr. Clark, being an architect, likely knew the true
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boundary lines. Indeed, on the west side, the house is set back almost exactly ten feet from
the record boundary line, in conformance with the subdivision requirements.5
Mr. Clark's subjective intent in building the fence, assuming he had testified in a
manner consistent with the Deans' position, does not establish the absence of mutual
acquiescence. Cf. EssentialBotanical, 2011UT71, ^[27. However, where observable factors
clearly explain that the fence's location was the product of concerns other than marking a
legal boundary, the absence of acquiescence by Mr. Clark and his successors is objectively
manifested.
Just about the only evidence in support of the Parks' assertion there was mutual
acquiescence is the fact that Mr. Clark and his successors did not access the Disputed Area,
and/or that the Parks' short fence blocked such access. However, a lack of access does not
establish acquiescence. See Carter v. Hanrath, 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996) (lack of access to
land at the bottom of a cliff does not constitute acquiescence that the top of the cliff is the
boundary). In any event, lack of access is merely a factor to be considered, as it was by Judge
Kennedy. (R. 274.)
The Parks criticize the trial court's findings regarding Mr. Clark's intent as
speculative; however, the evidence makes clear that the fence was placed in a functional and

5

If the property line was adjusted to where the fence was located, the side yard
setback would be only 5.86 feet. (R. 296:39; Ex. 3.) As the trial court noted, ruling that
the Parks were entitled to the Disputed Area would render the Deans' property out of
compliance with the Declaration. (R. 276.)
15

convenient location. Mr. Clark was concerned with privacy from his neighbors, not
establishing a legal dividing line between the lots. On the other hand, Mrs. Park had sufficient
actual knowledge of the nature and location of the true lot line that the trial court properly
concluded that she likewise did not understand and acquiesce to the fence as the true boundary
line.6
The most recent Supreme Court case on the issue, Essential Botanical Farms, LC, v.
Kay, 2011 UT 71, ^f26 fn. 38, notes that acquiescence "implies a relationship in which one
person takes affirmative actions, and the acquiescing party consents to such action by failing
to object." Noting that the strictures of linguistics should not necessarily govern, the Court
restated the standard as requiring proof that adjacent landowners "recognized and treated" the
line as the boundary. Id. The Parks fail to meet their burden under either approach. The
Parks cannot point to any action that either they or Mr. Clark (or his successors) took that
affirmed that the fence was located on the boundary line; moreover, the Parks cannot point
to evidence establishing that either they or Mr. Clark (or his successors) recognized and
treated the fence as the boundary. Accordingly, the evidence did not establish mutual
acquiescence.

6

As noted above, the fact that the Disputed Area was a steep and narrow area,
filled with rocks, trees, and roots, and had not been used by the Parks, likewise supports
the trial court's finding that the parties had not mutually acquiesced to the fence as the
boundary line.
16

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm the trial court.
DATED this^3f clay of November, 2011.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Bryce D. (Paja^er
(\
Attorneys for Appellees James D. Dean and
Sherlene T. Dean
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